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Abstract: This essay has two major parts. First, a comparison between poetry 
and comparative work itself. Second, a comparison of the Zhuangzi and 
Euripides’ Bacchae. Comparison is like a poem in that both are imaginative 
constructions that rely on the creativity of the comparatist or poet. Comparison 
and poetry take features of the world and alter them in such a way as to suggest 
an alternative. The Zhuangzi and the Bacchae, via the theme of forgetting, do 
the same thing—unsettle our fixed suppositions or knowledge. The argument 
that a comparative work is like a poem thus relies on the comparison of 
Zhuangzi and Euripides as an illustration. Both the Zhuangzi and the Bacchae 
invite a relinquishing of fixed knowledge, and depict a human nature that is 
tenuous and given to change. This article suggests that a similar experience 
characterizes the practice of comparison, and that such an experience is 
something we often see in poetry. 
This essay attempts to describe comparison as a poetic activity, supported by a 
somewhat freewheeling reading of Euripides’ Bacchae and the Zhuangzi. 
Questions of method in comparative work dominate the scholarship, but the role 
of imagination receives relatively little attention. I suggest some ways in which a 
comparative work is like a poem, and then think through the implications such a 
view might have carried. Euripides and Zhuangzi bring two things to the 
discussion. First, these two poetic writers give us texts that act upon us as we read 
them. Comparison as a poetic activity does the same to the comparatist. Second, I 
compare the Bacchae and the Zhuangzi on their incorporation of oblivion into 
form and content, thus demonstrating the very comparative process that I outline. 
For the purposes of this essay, when I speak of comparison, I am referring to a 
work of scholarship, usually in the humanities, that explicitly compares two 
thinkers or texts written in different languages or from two different cultures—the 
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sort of work one would typically find in comparative literature. Insightful 
comparison can be done between Plato and Aristotle, for example, but such a 
work need not be overly concerned with cross-cultural or cross-linguistic or even 
cross-temporal comparison. I also take it for granted that we generally think of 
science as tending towards the objective, and of poetry as tending towards the 
subjective. My goal is to think about scholarly comparison as, like a poem, a 
work of the imagination. 
G. E. R. Lloyd, a major voice in comparative studies of early Greece and 
China, has criticized two common and opposing approaches to comparison, both 
overgeneralization that flattens out the variety present in a culture (“the Chinese 
mindset” or “the Greek spirit”), and piecemeal approaches that cherry-pick 
apparently similar bits from different cultures incapable of supporting any 
substantial insights.
1
 I accept Lloyd’s argument for the most part, but I want to 
draw attention to the absence of creativity in his schema. Lloyd, and most 
comparative scholarship in Greece-China studies, focuses on method, on good or 
bad comparison, but does not consider why we compare. In contrast, I take my 
cue from Robin W. Lovin, who remarks that “there is more than method here, 
because the goal we set for our comparison is inevitably a way of bringing some 
order out of the porous and dangerous reality we are exploring.” (Lovin 2010, 
262) A “porous and dangerous reality” is precisely what Zhuangzi and Euripides 
depict in their poetic works, and this parallels the task of the comparatist: trying 
to impose temporary order on unstable and chaotic reality. 
Good comparison is hard work: choosing comparable points or problems, 
setting up qualifications and frameworks, trying to treat each object honestly and 
without distortion. To compare Aristotle and Confucius well, one must know 
something about Aristotle and Confucius: knowledge of Classical Greek and 
Classical Chinese, historical background, general skill in literary criticism and 
philosophical analysis, etc. These are skills that we take to be objective in some 
way. One can either read Aristotle in the original Classical Greek or one cannot, 
after all. The entire credentialing process in academia is in some sense premised 
on the idea that objectivity is possible: we set standards for language ability, for 
                                                             
1 Lloyd returns to this question of method countless times throughout his work. For a clear 
and thorough argument on these two pole of comparison, see G. E. R. Lloyd, Adversaries 
and Authorities: Investigations into Ancient Greek and Chinese Science (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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writing ability, for persuasiveness of argument, we review books according to a 
variety of impersonal criteria, and so on. As a work of scholarship, then, a 
comparison has some claims to objectivity. Granted, this is ambiguous. We do 
not think of a book review as being objective in the same way a lab experiment is 
objective. My point is just that comparison commands the same authority and 
glamor of objectivity as any other rigorous scholarship.  
And yet, a comparison does not yield any objective or permanent knowledge. 
Comparison is more idiosyncratic than science. Two scholars can compare Plato 
and Zhuangzi and come away with quite different understandings, with different 
knowledge even. This points to something whimsical about comparison. There is 
no particular reason why one should compare Plato and Zhuangzi, or Sappho and 
Wang Wei. A comparison of Plato and Aristotle makes a kind of obvious sense: 
one was a student of the other, and the question of how Plato’s views evolved and 
are challenged in Aristotle is almost natural. But in cross-cultural comparison, 
especially over so large a gap as between ancient Greece and China, this sort of 
obviousness is not available to us. The comparatist is left not only to compare, but 
also to explain and justify her comparison in a way the classicist is not. There is 
something unnatural about a comparison.  
Comparing Euripides and Zhuangzi, as I do below, tells us little about the 
evolution of Greek or Chinese civilization. Neither does it tell us anything broad 
about Greek tragic poetry. The two texts do not belong to the same genre, and in 
fact, early China had no tragic drama, and early Greece certainly had nothing like 
the genre-defying Zhuangzi (neither did early China, for that matter). But all this 
does not mean that we cannot glean something insightful from a comparison. 
Indeed, one of our motivations for comparison is to see thinkers or texts in a new 
light. Here we return to the “why” of comparison, to the personal motives and 
desires involved—something debates about comparative method tend to 
overlook. It would be dubious at best to claim that one needs to understand 
Sappho in order to understand Wang Wei. Each poet can and should be grasped 
on their own terms. 
Historian of religions J. Z. Smith once remarked that in the humanities we 
are denied the power of experiment.
2
 Much of what we study is ancient or 
                                                             
2 A paraphrase from an interview with Smith conducted by the University of Chicago’s 
campus newspaper in 2008:  
http://chicagomaroon.com/2008/06/02/full-j-z-smith-interview/. 
34 RYAN J. HARTE 
 
Journal of East-West Thought 
 
beyond easy manipulation—we cannot throw human beings or texts together in a 
petri dish or a particle accelerator to see what happens. Comparison, Smith 
argues, is our version of experiment. Speaking of creativity in science, we usually 
point to people who thought outside the box, who asked a question nobody had 
asked, who tried something different. This applies just as well to comparison. It is 
not immediately apparent why one ought to compare Sappho and Wang Wei, but 
a sufficiently creative comparatist might just make such an endeavor worth the 
price of admission.  
Any scholarly work has something of personal interest, of course. In 
comparison, however, this personal interest takes center stage. Sappho wrote lyric 
poetry, and describing what Wang Wei wrote as lyric poetry both fits and doesn’t 
fit. It’s hard to imagine Wang Wei, famous for his Buddhist-inflected verse 
focused on nature, writing any of Sappho’s lines expressing erotic desire. How to 
compare a poet known for her intensely personal love poetry with a poet known 
for her detached and impersonal nature poetry? To take Smith’s reasoning, the 
point of putting Sappho and Wang Wei into the particle accelerator and blasting 
them against each other is simply to see what happens. Might our presuppositions 
about lyric poetry be undermined by Wang Wei? Perhaps a defined persona or 
speaker is not a prerequisite for lyric after all, for example.
3
 The possibility of 
interesting conclusions alone seems somewhat shaky justification for juxtaposing 
two such disparate poets, and at bottom, the only real reason to compare Wang 
Wei and Sappho is because one wants to. This is why comparison should take 
into account personal creativity and imagination.  
A comparison is a made object, like a poem.
4
 The comparatist uses the 
powers of imagination and creativity to bring into being something that would not 
naturally exist. Euripides and Zhuangzi have no historical affinity to recommend 
comparison—it is only through the imagination of the comparatist that a pairing 
                                                             
3 This very point has recently been made by Jonathan Culler, who criticizes the narrow 
model of lyric poetry that reads lyric as a dramatic monologue, focusing on a speaker, an 
audience, a context, etc. To my point, however, Culler does not engage in any comparison 
outside the Western canon. A comparison with someone like Wang Wei, who often 
eschews any sort of clear speaker, would make Culler’s argument even stronger. See 
Jonathan Culler, Theory of the Lyric (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2015). 
4 Here I have in mind the Greek meaning of poiêsis— “making” in a broad sense. 
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takes place. This highlights the subjective dimension of comparison, a dimension 
often overlooked in scholarship, which is seen as more objective. We are 
obsessed over comparative method, I suggest, partly because we are invested in 
finding the “right” and the “wrong” way to compare. This implies objective 
values. My goal is not to deny that some comparisons are better than others. 
Rather, I want to push back against the overwhelming tendency, at least in 
Greece-China studies, that ignores the subjective elements in comparison in a 
way that we don’t do when dealing with poetry. Poetry is an especially rich 
analogue for comparison because a poem is a made object that in turn shapes us. 
Poetry has several qualities that, I venture to suggest, also apply to 
comparison.
5
 First, poetry exercises and thus strengthens the imagination. 
Second, more powerful imagination means more flexibility when it comes to 
seeing “internal and external events from different and ever-changing 
perspectives.” (Yearley 2011, 256) Third, poetry shows us the cracks in life, in 
the world, from which we might otherwise turn away. Our ability to forget or 
overlook may be necessary to life (e.g. moving past some trauma),
6
 but poetry 
keeps us honest, and prevents us from flying too far into fantastical denial. 
Fourth, poetry opens a space for encounters. On a formal level, we encounter 
unusual syntax or vocabulary that stretches our comprehension. Images and 
metaphors allow a poet to make ambivalent value claims, to mean more than one 
thing at the same time. Paradox, ambiguity, and contradiction are all at home in 
poetry, and this makes the experience of reading a poem potentially 
transformative. Poet and critic Robin Skelton explains it thus: “because it 
communicates in intuitive, emotional, sensual, and intellectual ways, and because 
it involves its reader in sharing as well as recognizing an experience, [poetry] 
presents a kind of ‘total’ perception which is not available elsewhere. The reader 
undergoes and observes an experience at the same time.” (Skelton 1978, 76. My 
                                                             
5 Any sort of complete philosophy of poetry is well beyond the scope of this essay, but I 
draw here on remarks about poetic language by Simon Critchley, Things Merely Are: 
Philosophy in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens (New York: Routledge, 2005) and by Lee H. 
Yearley, “Poetic Language: Zhuangzi and Du Fu’s Confucian Ideals” in Ethics in Early 
China, eds. Chris Fraser, Dan Robins, and Timothy O’Leary (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2011), pp. 245-266. 
6 I call this “oblivion” and discuss it at more length below in my comparison of Euripides 
and Zhuangzi. 
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italics) This last point is perhaps the most important feature of poetry for my 
purposes here. Poetry is a made thing, but the process of writing or reading poetry 
in turn shapes us. To borrow Simon Critchley’s phrasing: 
 
Poetry allows us to see things as they are. It lets us see particulars being 
various. But, and this is its peculiarity, poetry lets us see things as they are 
anew, under a new aspect, transfigured, subject to a felt variation… Poetry 
describes life as it is, but in all the intricate evasions of as. It gives us the world 
as it is—common, near, low, recognizable—but imagined, illumined, turned 
about. It is a world both seen and unseen until seen with the poet’s eyes. 
(Critchley 2005, 11–12) 
 
Poetry presents us with our world transformed, with a scene or an object or a 
feeling that is familiar but somehow altered. Poetry suggests how the world or a 
situation might be other than it is, even if the difference is only minuscule. 
Crucially, the poet works with the world already present to us, but it is a world 
that we cannot see until the poet’s imagination orients the light for our vision.  
Comparison is analogous to this view of poetry. The goal in comparison is not 
so much generating or acquiring some new knowledge or propositional content 
(although this is involved). Instead, we can think of comparison as an experience 
that disrupts, challenges, or shatters what we thought was fixed knowledge. 
Comparison confronts us with reality as we know it but slightly different. Wang 
Wei is not as alien to a Western reader as to be unintelligible, but he might call 
into doubt what we think we know about lyric poetry and poetic voice. Zhuangzi 
challenges the very practice of intelligible discourse, performing linguistic feats 
unknown to someone trained only in European languages, undermining even the 
basic safety one feels in making simple subject-predicate claims. What sort of 
stable knowledge about poetry can one have when “poetry” must include such 
disparities as Homer, the Shijing, Sappho, Sophocles, the Tianwen, and Wang 
Wei? Comparison is an interpretive vertigo constructed by the comparatist, a 
vertigo that in turn unsettles distinctions and fixed knowledge, offering glimpses 
of an alternative, of another way of doing things.
7
  
                                                             
7 For the phrase “interpretive vertigo” I am indebted to Jennifer Rapp, whose article on a 
poetics of comparison inspired by her own. While following Rapp somehow, I depart from 
her in several ways, the most obvious of which is that her argumentative focus is on the 
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Lee H. Yearley describes comparison as “imaginative construction” at the 
close of his comparative study Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and 
Conceptions of Courage: 
 
As comparativists we manipulate the different and the common as we work. 
We choose which to highlight and which to neglect, and we choose when to 
relate them. We must work from similarities, else we will establish only 
contrasts or perhaps even in commensurabilities. But even then our work is 
anamorphic not homologous. The similarities always are just resemblances; 
they live in and usually are deeply informed by sharply divergent contexts. We 
must also pursue differences, however, if the comparisons are to be more than 
juts tautological exercises. If they are to be interesting, revealing, and therefore 
also inevitably problematic, differences must be highlighted. Neither the 
equivocal nor the univocal can be neglected; to focus on the analogical is to 
work constantly with each and between both of them. (Yearley 1990, 199) 
 
I want to make several points here. First, Yearley’s distinction between the 
equivocal (ambiguous) and the univocal (unambiguous) parallels the distinction 
between objective and subjective. On Yearley’s model, comparison aims at both 
multiple interpretations and singular meanings, at subjective whimsy and 
objective knowledge. The poet must capture the distinctive concreteness of a 
vase, a fountain, a landscape, an emotion, while also making a poem that 
communicates to other minds. Second, Yearley describes the comparative process 
as analogical. Analogies do not exist naturally; they are fleeting and come into 
being only to better understand one or both of the separate analogues. An analogy 
is not simply two objects—it is two objects placed in a special relation by the 
analogist. Likewise, a comparison is not merely two objects juxtaposed (i.e. 
Lloyd’s piecemeal approach). The comparatist must build a framework within 
which comparison takes place, and like an analogy, there is great room for 
creativity here. The same two objects can be analogous in a variety of ways, and 
one comparatist will bring out something that a different comparatist does not. 
                                                                                                                                          
ethical dimensions of comparison. I have also tried to take what seems a good pairing in 
Euripides and Zhuangzi and make it clearer on several fronts. See Jennifer Rapp, “A 
Poetics of Comparison: Euripides, Zhuangzi, and the Human Poise of Imaginative 
Construction” in Journal of the American Academy of Religion 78:1 (2010), pp. 163-201.  
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Sappho and Li Qingzhao may both sing of love, but they do it in their own 
distinct voices. 
How are we to understand comparative work if it is imaginative or poetic? 
Yearley notes that viewing comparison as an imaginative act does not mean “that 
standards dissolve”—rather, the “possibility of error remains.” (Yearley 1990, 
197) We evaluate works of creative imagination all the time, and we need not 
admit the slippery idea that all opinions are equal when it comes to poetry. 
Comparison as a poem can be evaluated on three levels. First, there is basic 
accuracy. Mistakes of language or terminology, inaccurate or incomplete 
historical knowledge, errors in analytic or logical reasoning—one can criticize a 
poetic comparison on all these grounds without giving up the poetic model I am 
describing.  
Second, we can evaluate a poetic comparison more conceptually. Poetry does 
violence to the world and to language itself, twisting words and ideas into strange 
contortions, defamiliarizing our own world to us. This gives poetry its power to 
unnerve or to strike us with wonder. What business, after all, does the archaic 
Greek poet Stesichorus have describing a river as “root-silver” or a child as 
“bruiseless”? Comparison as poetry should also be understood to twist its objects. 
The juxtaposition of two thinkers or texts from disparate cultures inevitably 
comes with distortion, but perhaps distortion per se is not the enemy. 
Comparatists have an ethical obligation to the facts, of course. And because we 
want any new knowledge generated by the comparison to be valuable, we must 
strive for accuracy and rigor. We want to take each comparandum on its own 
terms, but comparison itself undermines that very goal. My point is that 
comparison as poem can be evaluated for its conceptual construction—how it is 
framed, how it treats its comparanda—while still taking into account that the 
construction is going to be a little wobbly. The aim is not fixed and permanent 
objective knowledge. The aim is a creative juxtaposition that may grant 
temporary insight. We should no more demand objectivity of a comparison than 
we would of a poem.  
Third, the most common methodological complaint when it comes to 
comparison is that X and Y are simply “not comparable.” Why? If a comparison is 
an imaginative construction, something creatively made by the comparatist, then 
there is a sense in which the comparatist’s imagination is its own justification. 
What makes Plato and Zhuangzi comparable? A comparatist qualified and willing 
to compare them. The results of that comparison may be more or less interesting, 
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insightful, or illuminating, but that is how poems work too. We do not ask the 
poet to justify her poem—we only read it. In fact, in poetry, two terms that lack 
an obvious connection make a good metaphor, because they force the mind in 
new directions. We should not be so quick to dismiss a comparison because of 
seeming incomparability. Afterwards, we might never read a certain poem again, 
we might think it missed something essential, we might find it derivative, but we 
do not ask the poet to justify the creative act itself. The comparison that looks 
wobbly and incapable of supporting its own weight may, in the end, offer flashes 
of insight.
8
 Zhuangzi and Plato could very well have conspired when nobody was 
looking: both agreeing to grapple with the problem of language, the dangers of 
transmitting wisdom in writing, the deployment of a butcher analogy. The two 
philosophers did not pass notes behind our backs, but by comparing them, 
millennia after they have died, we construct something that might give us more 
knowledge about both texts than either text could on its own. As is the case with 
poetry, we might learn something about humans more generally, we might have 
our suspicions confirmed. Or, conversely, we might be forced to abandon beliefs 
we took for granted, to shift our awareness of the world. This is what I mean 
when I say that a comparison is a made object that in turn affects the maker and 
the reader; comparison dislodges our fixed knowledge.  
The poem as a made object contains two pairs of tensions that also 
characterize comparison. First, a poet must navigate the conflicting demands of 
necessity and randomness. Some elements of poetic convention result from bare 
facts about the language. Ancient Greek poetry, for example, never rhymes, 
whereas Italian poetry almost always rhymes. Other poetic conventions are more 
random, such as stanzaic structure. The poet must voice her subjectivity in this 
pre-existing context. Some conventions facilitate poetic expression while other 
conventions may stifle or complicate it. In the end, the personal voice of the poet 
emerges changed—not entirely subsumed or quashed by necessity, but not able to 
entirely dispense with it either. The poet is situated at a confluence of objective 
necessity and subjective expression. The comparatist occupies similar ground, 
constrained by the necessity of doing justice to her comparanda and her distinct 
traditions but also trying to construct her own imaginative bridges between two 
far-flung topics.  
                                                             
8 Rapp 2010 illustrates this point at length with her insightful reading of Kay Ryan’s poem 
“Ghost Ribs.” 
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Second, the poet must make her subjective experience mesh with a wider 
audience. We can imagine a poem so solipsistic that it cannot penetrate the public 
that it does not extend a hand for the reader to clasp in recognition of shared 
humanity. Formally, this consideration might affect the poet’s use of symbolism or 
imagery, language, diction, and topic. As mentioned above, the poet does not 
divorce entirely from the common human world even as she gestures to another 
one. For the comparatist, subjective intuition must still hold up in the wider world 
of a scholarly audience. Failure would be a comparison of pure whimsy, without 
any substantive “proof” on the part of the comparatist propping up the 
juxtaposition. 
These shared features of poetry and comparison reflect Yearley’s description 
of comparison as an analogical, imaginative process. He remarks that the 
comparatist may be driven to compare by “the inchoate but pressing need we feel 
to put vague ideas into the ordered form that analogical analyses demand.” 
(Yearley 1990, 201) Comparison, like poetry, begins from intuition or a flash of 
understanding or a vague feeling. The objective and analytical rigor of 
scholarship offers the comparatist the chance to capture this poetic impulse and 
sort through it in language. Yearley also calls attention to the ways in which 
comparison can “produce personally informed, evocative kinds of invention” with 
“the power to give a new form to our experiences.” (Ibid. 197) Comparison 
begins from the suspicion or the thought that some similarity or difference would 
exist between two things if only we could draw them together somehow. This 
suspicion is then either confirmed, denied, or complicated by the comparative act 
itself. In Yearley’s phrasing, “we assume, entertain, consider, and even toy with 
or pretend that certain constructions of experience are true.” (Ibid. 200)  Like 
poetry, comparison involves a perception of how things are, how things might be 
otherwise, and a willingness to relinquish those perceptions.  
I turn now to a comparison of Euripides’ Bacchae and the Zhuangzi, 
beginning with the following statement by Martha Nussbaum on the former: 
 
In the middle of this cosmos sits the human world, a world of social morality, 
of pity and compassion, of fellow feeling with other mortal intelligent beings. 
But the human realm is not shown, here [the play], as self-sufficient. Its walls 
are highly porous: influences flow in from the other realms, and human beings 
make strange and sudden exists into them. What is stranger still is that, 
apparently, their full humanity depends on these exits… So if human beings 
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close themselves off from Dionysus’ call, they apparently become less than 
fully human. But if they listen to Dionysus, this carries…the risk of another 
sort of beastliness. Humanness appears as an unstable and temporary 
achievement, poised among dangers of many kinds. And the deep question of 
the play is: What is a human morality, and what is its relation to the 
acknowledgment of Dionysus? Can there be a life that repudiates this religion 
and also remains moral, civilized, and fully human? (And who are the 
spectators of this place, seated in an apparently civilized manner in the theater 
of Dionysus?) ( Nussbaum 1990, xx) 
  
Nussbaum’s description of the Bacchae raises possible similarities between this 
Greek tragedy and the Zhuangzi. The Zhuangzi depicts humanness as “highly 
porous,” and also suggests that “full humanity depends on these exits.” At the 
same time, the Zhuangzi seems to resist offering any fundamental essence of 
human life—in Nussbaum’s terms, “humanness appears as an unstable and 
temporary achievement.” The Zhuangzi repeatedly “repudiates this religion” or 
that religion—that is, the Zhuangzi consistently rejects various ideals and 
dogmas, and thus confronts the problem of whether such a life “remains moral, 
civilized, and fully human.” Lastly, although the Zhuangzi is certainly not a 
dramatic work, it does have spectators—readers—who might well ask about the 
intended target of such a genre-defying text. We are “seated in an apparently 
civilized manner” reading and teaching the Zhuangzi, even as the Zhuangzi itself 
undermines formal teaching, direct transmission of knowledge, and legible 
discourse itself. Nussbaum’s remark draws attention to how the Bacchae does 
something similar: Euripides presents good Athenian audiences with a play in 
which they witness the total breakdown of civilized and familial order, in which 
the line between reality and illusion blurs to disastrous effect. In both cases, the 
audience occupies a position that the text seems to take into account. 
I have claimed that comparison, like poetry, unsettles our fixed knowledge. In 
what follows, I explore the role of oblivions in the Zhuangzi and the Bacchae on 
the level of form and content. Oblivions also unsettle fixation, incorporate 
instability and loss into the texts. But such instability or loss is not wholly 
negative, and Euripides and Zhuangzi demonstrate the ambivalence of oblivion. 
By the end, I hope to have highlighted this point and also to have shown how it 
bears on comparison-as-a-poem.  
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The Ancient Greek lêthê (λήθη) means “forgetting,” but also, in older 
Homeric contexts, “place of oblivion.” 9 Related to lêthê is the verb lanthanô 
(λανθάνω), meaning “to look away,” “to go unnoticed,” “to overlook.”10 The 
Ancient Greek word for “truth” is alêtheia (ἀλήθεια), and in the archaic period, 
alêtheia was commonly opposed to lêthê, thus giving alêtheia a literal meaning of 
“not forgotten” or “unconcealed” (a “not” + lêthê). (Detienne 1999) Forgetting 
and looking away therefore have a relationship to notions of truth. Forgetting in 
the context of ancient Greek literature often carries several of these meanings at 
once, especially in poetic or philosophical usage. In Classical Chinese, wang 忘 
carries a similar range of meanings: “forget,” “omit,” “neglect.” The semantic 
components of the character are xin 心 (“heart-mind”) and wang 亡 (“destroy,” 
“perish,” “flee”), thus giving wang 忘 a sense of something having fled from or 
been destroyed in the mind.
11
 By “forgetting” I intend all of these meanings, 
literal and figurative. My goal is to just briefly suggest that the Bacchae and the 
Zhuangzi display forgetting in similar ways, both in their content and in their 
written form.  
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to make any overarching argument 
for the importance of forgetting in human life. A brief sketch of the concept will 
clarify the idea. Ever since Plato, the Western tradition has tended to emphasize the 
importance of memory. In orthodox Platonism, we are fallen creatures and require 
rational philosophizing to recollect the Forms, the transcendent objects of pure 
intellection. Our ignorance of Truth or Justice or Wisdom is thus a forgetting of 
those Forms. We might also think of the injunctions to “never forget” that circulate 
the media airwaves after some collective disaster or trauma. This reflects 
something of the ancient Greek view that forgetting entails an oblivion, an 




                                                             
9 Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. 
10 Ibid. 
11  Although semantic breakdowns of Chinese characters are not always reliable 
explanations of meaning, I think that in this case the breakdown is suggestive and not 
far-fetched. The Shuowen jiezi 說文解字, a traditional etymological dictionary, defines 
wang 忘 as 不識也: “not knowing” or “not acknowledging.” This is similar to the sense 
of “not notice” or “look away” of lanthanô. 
12 For a good overview of memory in the Western philosophical tradition that clearly 
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American poet C. K. Williams sums up the position I take on forgetting: 
“Forgetfulness is one of the gods’ most precious offerings to us… perhaps that is 
because we have to look away before we can begin again.” (Williams 1998, 
91-93) Williams’ remark echoes the semantic range of forgetting outlined above. 
In describing forgetting as a divine gift, however, he hints that forgetting may be 
more ambivalent than we commonly suppose. Consider this hypothetical, a 
common example: running up against writer’s block, a scholar closes her laptop 
in frustration, unable to untangle the messy argument into which she has dug 
herself. After a few days away from her work, as she sits in traffic on her way to 
meet a friend, her rambling mind returns to the argument and she can no longer 
even recall why she was hung-up in the first place. Whatever problem had 
seemed so entrenched now seems inconsequential, and later that night she sits 
back down to work and breezes through several pages. This is just one mundane 
instance of how looking away, figurative forgetting, allows humans to move on 
through life. Euripides and Zhuangzi demonstrate forgetting in this ambivalent 
sense, both in ordinary and in radical ways.  
Human life requires forgetting, requires gaps and inattention. Nussbaum’s 
remarks on the Bacchae describe human life as tenuous, poised between an array 
of competing tensions. One major tension of human life is the pull between 
memory and forgetting. The Zhuangzi and the Bacchae show forgetting as an 
essential part of human existence, a feature and not a bug. In my above example, 
forgetting yields some new outlook; it allows one to recover insight or move past 
a fixation. Forgetting may also be destructive, though, as Euripides especially 
shows. The tension between memory and forgetting is uniquely suited to 
exploring human life as “highly porous.” Nussbaum claims that the human world 
and human life are characterized by incursions from outside forces (gods, 
madness, passions, etc.), and by a disruption of the boundaries between beast, 
human, and god. She emphasizes that “full humanity depends on these exits,” on 
these border crossings. Forgetting is one way that we cross these borders, one 
way that we experience the precarious poise of human life. This precariousness 
also characterizes the position of the comparatist, poised among the competing 
tensions of objectivity and subjectivity, between necessity and whimsy. 
                                                                                                                                          
displays the bias towards remembering over forgetting, see: Dmitri Nikulin, ed., Memory: 
A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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I begin with a comparison between the physical body and the textual body. 
The body and the theme of embodiment, in Euripides and in Zhuangzi, often 
involves forgetting or inattention of some sort. Since the two poets also reflect 
forgetting in their written form, it makes sense to ask about the similarities between 
physical and textual embodiment. Some concrete examples may make this clearer.  
 One of the Zhuangzi’s more iconic instances of forgetting comes in Chapter 







Yan Hui said, “I’m making progress.” 
Confucius said, “What do you mean?” 
“I’ve forgotten all about humaneness [ren 仁] and responsibility [yi 義].” 
“Okay, but you’re not there yet.” 
He came another day and said, “I’m making progress.” 
Confucius asked, “What do you mean?” 
“I’ve forgotten all about propriety [li 禮] and music [yue 樂].” 
“Okay, but you’re not there yet.” 
He came yet again another day and said, “I’m making progress.” 
Confucius asked, “How so?” 
“I just sit and forget [zuowang 坐忘].” 
Confucius, startled, asked, “What do you mean… ‘sit and forget?’” 
“Limbs and torso drop away, senses and perceptions are chased away. 
Disperse physical form and farewell knowledge and become one with vast 
openness [同於大通]. I call this ‘sitting and forgetting.’” 
 
                                                             
13 Zhuangzi 6.9. Translation is my own, and follows Ziporyn 2009 and Kohn 2011. See: 
Brook Ziporyn, Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings with Selections from Traditional 
Commentaries (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2009) and Livia Kohn, Chuang-tzu: The 
Tao of Perfect Happiness. Selections Annotated and Explained (Woodstock, Vermont: 
Skylight Paths Press, 2011). 
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This passage has generated a small sea of scholarship, which I cannot review 
here. Let me confine attention to a few points. “Sitting and forgetting,” zuowang 
坐忘, is the key term of the passage. Livia Kohn glosses the phrase as “sitting in 
oblivion,” (Kohn 2014, 127ff) which dovetails nicely with the old Homeric 
meaning of the Greek lêthê as “place of oblivion.” Yan Hui’s senses reel and his 
perceptions fade. This relinquishing of attention and awareness suggests 
similarity to lanthanô, to a shared ground between forgetting and turning away. In 
Yan Hui’s case, this oblivion, this relinquishing of attention, also means a turning 
away from social norms like ritual (li 禮) and responsibility (yi 義). This passage 
depicts oblivion as a state of simultaneous loss and gain, of annihilation and 
recuperation. Yan Hui gives up his senses, his bodily form, his place in the social 
tapestry, and yet this “does not mean eradicating one’s self.” (Jochim 1998, 55) 
The self is not destroyed entirely but rather is depicted as something open and 
shifting, something unstable and temporary. The ambivalence of oblivion is clear: 
Yan Hui forgets his body and his responsibilities, but he gains a new perspective, 
a fusion with “vast openness.” One might also think of the iconic opening scene 
of the Zhuangzi in which the Kun fish transforms into the Peng bird—the loss of 
one bodily form coincides with a shift of perspective, literally a bird’s-eye view 
of all creation. 
Yan Hui’s physical body, his form (xing 形) dissolves; the Zhuangzi presents 
this idea not just in the context of an individual human body, but also in the 
context of the textual body: 
 
荃者所以在魚得魚而忘荃蹄者所以在兔得兔而忘蹄言者所以在意得意而
忘言吾安得忘言之人而與之言哉 ( Zhuangzi 26.13) 
 
Fish traps are there for fish; once you get the fish, you forget the trap. Snares 
are there for rabbits; once you get the rabbit, you forget the snare. Words are 
there for meaning [yi 意]; once you get the meaning, you forget the words. 
Where can I find someone who has forgotten words and have a few words with 
him? 
 
Here language itself drops away, relinquished just like Yan Hui’s bodily form and 
social attachments. The passage reminds one of Wittgenstein’s famous ladder: 
“My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally 
recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, 
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over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up 
on it.)”14 Nussbaum’s description of human nature in the Bacchae does not reject 
any sense of identity whatsoever, just as Wittgenstein’s ladder does not deny the 
possibility of acquiring awareness. The ladder, however, must be cast aside after 
it does its work which, for Wittgenstein, is to bring the reader to an understanding 
of the senselessness of Wittgenstein’s own propositions. He uses the ladder as a 
metaphor for a text that undoes itself. In the above passage, the Zhuangzi suggests 
that its language, like Wittgenstein’s, might be forgotten once the meaning is 
clear.  
Crucially, this is not an endorsement of nihilism—the point is not that 
everything is devoid of all meaning. Remember that Yan Hui does not turn away 
from the body and from society to a state of annihilation. Oblivion diverts 
attention, opens up gaps, and in the process allows something new to form or take 
place. Oblivion is ambivalent. The Zhuangzi demonstrates how oblivion registers 
on the bodily and the textual level, and how in both cases, this forgetting is 
nevertheless productive, leading to some new awareness or transformation. The 
ambivalent nature of oblivion, its potential for destruction and creation, is why 
human nature is tenuous, poised between competing forces. Forgetting 
exemplifies this ambivalence, on both a bodily and a textual level, in the 
Zhuangzi. One more example of forgetting in the Zhuangzi may help to make my 
point about this ambivalence. 
In Chapter 20, “The Mountain Tree” (shan mu 山木), we find the story of 








鵲感吾顙遊於栗林而忘真栗林虞人以吾為戮吾所以不庭也  (Zhuangzi 
20.8) 
 
                                                             
14 Tractatus #6.54. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. C.K. 
Ogden (Sweden: Chiron Academic Press, 2016. Originally published 1922). 
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While rambling about Diaoling Park, Zhuang Zhou spotted a weird bird 
coming from the south. Its wings spanned seven feet, and its eyes were a 
whole hand span wide. The bird brushed Zhuang Zhou’s forehead, and then 
landed in a chestnut grove. Zhuang Zhou exclaimed, “What kind of bird is this? 
Huge wings but clumsy, big eyes but blind!” 
 
He grabbed his robes and walked out, cocking his crossbow and steadying 
himself. He then spied a cicada that had gotten itself a pretty patch of shade 
and forgotten itself [忘其身]. Nearby, a mantis raised its pincers to spring on 
the cicada, but, concentrating on its prey, the mantis forget itself [忘其形]. The 
weird bird, behind the mantis, prepared to take advantage and swoop in, but in 
its own concentration the bird forgot itself [忘其真].  
 
Zhuang Zhou cried out. “Things are bound so tightly together. Even different 
sorts of creatures [二類] are all bound up together!” He put up his crossbow 
and turned to leave, but a gamekeeper followed and started scolding him.  
 
Zhuang Zhou went back home, and for three months didn’t even exit the house 
into the courtyard to talk with his students. Lin Qie approached him and asked, 
“Master, why have you stopped teaching us in the courtyard?” Zhuang Zhou 
said, “In preserving my own form [守形] I forgot myself [忘身]. I stared into 
muddy water and confused it for a clear pool. I’ve heard Laozi say that when 
you go where common folks go, you ought to do as they do. Recently, I was 
roaming through Diaoling and forgot myself [忘吾身]. A weird bird brushed 
my forehead, and I meandered off into the chestnut grove and forgot these 
truths. The warden of the grove took me for a poacher! That’s why I’m not 
coming into the courtyard.” 
 
Here we see the ambivalence of forgetting on full display. For Yan Hui, the 
oblivion of forgetting allowed a transformation into a new way of being in the 
world. For Zhuang Zhou, the oblivion of forgetting almost got him killed—the 
gamekeeper nearly clipped his wings as surely as he attempted to do the same to 
the strange bird. The repetition of wang 忘 (“forget”) through this passage 
drives home an element of danger inherent to all oblivions. The cicada, the 
mantis, the bird, and Zhuang Zhou himself each fixated on an object of desire and 
in doing so forgot. Following Nussbaum’s view of human nature as “an unstable 
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and temporary achievement,” I propose that the enemy of human flourishing is 
not oblivion per se but rather fixation. 
Fixation, inflexibility, obsession—nothing comes under fire more in the 
Zhuangzi. A major interpretation of the text is that distinctions and classifications 
ossify thought itself, binding us and diminishing our powers. The Zhuangzi aims 
at a way of life more “flexible, tolerant, and aware of the infinite range of 
possible ways of responding to life.” (Hansen 1992, 284) Forgetting—so often 
viewed as a negative to be avoided or corrected in Platonism and its 
descendants—is, in the Zhuangzi, an ambivalent oblivion. 
Euripides’ presentation of the tension between memory and forgetting, 
between attention and inattention, is grimmer: bluntly stated, nobody is torn to 
pieces while still living because of oblivion in the Zhuangzi. The Bacchae 
concerns itself with the power of illusion, with the complications that arise from 
the entanglement of seeing and not seeing the truth. In the content of the play, 
illusion and delusion abound: King Pentheus denies the truth of the foreign god 
Dionysus; the women of Thebes have forgotten their responsibilities and roles 
and fixated ecstatically on the god, retreating into the mountains to dance and 
sing; Dionysus himself repeatedly transforms and disguises himself; Pentheus is 
dressed up as a woman to spy on the wild maenads (the Theban women now 
devoted to Dionysus); the maenads, led by Pentheus’ mother Agave, tear the 
young king apart limb from limb. That is, in the end, Agave’s forgetting is so 
annihilative that she murders her own son, only remembering herself when she 
stands, bloodied, with his head in her hands. One might say that Pentheus fixates 
on trying to prove what’s real, trying to discredit Dionysus, to the extent that he is 
unaware of the significance of the world around him, an inattention that 
ultimately seals his fate.  
The Bacchae reflects the themes of oblivion not only in its dramatic content 
but also in its poetic form. At one point in the play, Dionysus summons an 
earthquake to reduce the Theban palace to fire and ruin. The language of the 
chorus stresses the element of vision in such a way as to draw attention to the 
illusory nature of the play itself: “Did you see these stone lintels upon the 
columns spread apart?” and “Do you not behold the fire, do you not see it around 
Semele’s holy tomb?”15 When Dionysus appears onstage, he asks, “Did you 
                                                             
15 Bacchae 591 ff. Translations and italics come from the translations used by Segal (cited 
in full below). 
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perceive, as is likely, the Bacchic god shake the palace?” (Bacchae 604–605) 
Charles Segal explains the emphasis thus: “The physical reality of the miracle is 
not denied, but the phrasing stresses the subjective side of the event.” (Segal 
1982, 221) Euripides uses the language of chorus and of the god to formally 
underscore the tension between objective reality and subjective perception, a 
tension that permeates the story of the play (and also the work of the 
comparatist). The boundary between reality and illusion is one the poet toys with, 
as Segal elaborates: 
 
[The poet’s] concern is not just to depict a coherent reality but to question the 
symbolic discourse and the aesthetic means that enable him to create the world 
his characters inhabit… The miraculous power of Dionysus to elude Pentheus’ 
bonds and emerge from the enclosed darkness into the “light” (cf. the Chorus’s 
cry, “O greatest light,” phaos megiston, 608) contains the kernel of the entire 
play. The audience that responds to the religious thrill of the god’s saving light 
from darkness is also submitting to the magic of the poet’s fiction acted out 
before them… Within the play, as within the audience’s reaction to the play, 
the real and the imagined event, the act and the emotion, are strangely, 
inextricably blended. (Ibid., 222–223) 
 
The chorus of Greek tragedy occupies a key role in this in-between quality of the 
play. More has been written on the complex and puzzling role of the Greek tragic 
chorus than can possibly be summarized here,
16
 but a few brief remarks will make 
my point. The chorus is not a character, and this means that the chorus is not 
limited in the way a character might be—by linear or plot progression, by 
emotional and personal and intellectual unity, and so on. The chorus dances 
(indeed, this is the original meaning of the word “orchestra,” a dancing ground), it 
moves—similarly, the boundaries of the chorus shift. Renaud Gagné and 
Marianne Govers Hopman explain: 
 
                                                             
16 For a decent overview, see P. E. Easterling Ed., The Cambridge Companion to Greek 
Tragedy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) and Graham Ley, The 
Theatricality of Greek Tragedy: Playing Space and Chorus (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2007). 
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If the central characters are simultaneously here and there, on stage and in the 
play, the chorus can simultaneously be here, there, and elsewhere, now and 
then, this and that, meld one into the other, and pass freely between these 
different levels through the semantics of word, sound, and movement. Its 
well-known ability to reference itself and its own dance in performance, or to 
‘project’ itself on other, distant choruses, is part of a much wider pattern of 
mimetic transfer set in motion by the choral song. Without ever breaking the 
dramatic illusion, the chorus can radically shift the focus from one level of 
reference to another and create greater depth through a superimposition of 
semantic layers. (Gagné and Govers 2013, 1) 
 
The chorus plays a mediating role, able to shift attention from meaning to 
meaning, from idea to idea, even from one frame of reference to another 
(sometimes breaking the fourth wall and sometimes dialoguing directly with 
characters). The Bacchae amplifies this element of the chorus: “One of the 
decisive features of the Bacchae is the fact that it is arguably the only transmitted 
tragedy where the dramatic and performative roles of the chorus are intertwined, 
and, as far as dancing is concerned, are practically indiscriminate and identical.” 
(Bierl 2013, 211) So the chorus, especially in the Bacchae, is a form of 
self-awareness on the part of the text, a way to pull the audience or reader into the 
action, and a formal manifestation of themes and content in the text.  
The Zhuangzi has no chorus, but the text does have a feature that performs a 
similar role. Chapter 27 of the Zhuangzi, titled (following Ziporyn) “Words 
Lodged Elsewhere” (yuyan 寓言), identifies three types of language or rather, 
words (yan 言): lodging words (yuyan 寓言), double words (chongyan 重言), 
and goblet words (zhiyan 卮言).17 Lodging language “lodges words elsewhere,” 
meaning to “put one’s words into the mouths of other people.” (Lin 1994, 53 and 
Wang 2004, 202In this sense, the meaning behind a word is lodged elsewhere. 
                                                             
17 For comprehensive overviews of this schema, see Youru Wang, “The Strategies of 
‘Goblet Words’: Indirect Communication in the Zhuangzi.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 
31.2 (2004), pp. 195–218, and Linguistic Strategies in Daoist Zhuangzi and Chan 
Buddhism: The Other Way of Speaking (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003). See also 
Shuen-fu Lin, “The Language of the ‘Inner Chapters’ of the Chuang Tzu,” in Willard J. 
Peterson, Andrew H. Plaks, and Ying-shih Yü Ed., The Power of Culture: Studies in 
Chinese History (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1994), pp. 47-69. 
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More complicatedly, lodging language allows the speaker in the text (a character 
or narrator or whoever) to inhabit the position of the intended audience. The most 
infamous example from the Zhuangzi might be the figure of Confucius, usually 
depicted in dialogue with one of his disciples. Such scenes offer the reader 
familiar ground on which to orient herself, characters who come with readily 
accessible viewpoints, an easy entry into the text. This facilitated entry of the 
reader into the text then makes it even more effective when the Zhuangzi 
undermines or subverts a figure as famous as Confucius. But why would the 
Zhuangzi not simply ridicule or attack Confucius directly? Yearley highlights 
features of lodging language that separate it from regular ad hominem assault: 
“One feature is the nurture of sympathetic identification. The other is the nurture 
of our ability to move among positions that differ from those that normally attract 
and hold us.” (Yearley 2005, 510) This second feature is crucial. The Zhuangzi 
presents a kind of wandering as a spiritual or philosophical ideal, as an exemplary 
way of moving through life. Yearley remarks: “This kind of lodging place 
language involves wandering among positions in which you might lodge. It 
exhibits, that is, the spiritual perfection of the wanderer, the person who may 
temporarily light in one or another place, but whose lodging is always temporary 
and contingent.” (Ibid., 511) Here one is reminded of the striking opening chapter 
of the Zhuangzi and its title, emblematic of the text, “Free and Easy Wandering” 
(xiao yao you 逍遙遊).18 
Double language (chongyan 重言) refers to words that contain multiple 
layers or rays of meaning that refract an opalescent light and thus convey and 
conceal a whole host of meanings.
19
 Double language corresponds roughly to 
figurative language, wherein a word expresses more than its denotative meaning. 
Depending on if one reads 重 as “zhong” instead of “chong,” “heavy words” is 
also an acceptable translation in the sense that these words often carry 
                                                             
18 An excellent meditation on the philosophical significance of “free and easy wandering” 
for the whole Zhuangzi, including an argument for why the phrase summarizes the entire 
text, can be found in Kuang-min Wu, The Butterfly as Companion: Meditations on the 
First Three Chapters of the Chuang Tzu (Albany, New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1990). 
19 For this interpretation of chongyan 重言 see Wu, “Goblet Words, Dwelling Words, 
Opalescent Words—Philosophical Methodology of Chuang Tzu,” Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy 15 (1988), pp. 1-8. 
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authoritative weight, especially when put into the mouths of traditional figures. 
According to Yearley, the power of double or heavy language lies in its ability to 
knock us out of complacency, to ram us with the authority of a speaker or source 
so as to bring us up short. In this way, double/heavy language might be what 
dislodges us from our temporary positions occupied via lodging language. For 
example, near the end of Chapter 2, Ju Quezi asks Chang Wuzi, “So how do I 
know that enjoying life isn’t just a delusion?”20 The question is then rephrased 
and repeated several different ways, each hammering down like an existential 
blow: “How do I know that those who hate death are not just exiles who don’t 
know the way home?”21 “How do I know that the dead don’t regret ever craved 
life?”22 Yearley writes of double/heavy language that “initial bewilderment is 
often followed by the kind of insight that both brings satisfaction, at least 
temporarily, and embeds within us a notion, phrase, or story.” (Yearley 2005, 
512) Bewilderment followed by insight and accompanied by absorption is similar 
to the effect that poetry often has on us (especially the memorizing, on a bodily, 
rhythmic level, lyrics that are nevertheless not always clear). Double/heavy 
language “often brings us up short; our ordinary intellectual inertia is overcome 
by something both perplexing and exciting.”23 
Goblet or spillover language (zhiyan 卮言) is sometimes understood to 
describe the Zhuangzi’s overall philosophical stance on language rather than any 
particular linguistic strategy. Shuen-fu Lin describes goblet language as “speech 
that is natural, unpremeditated, free from preconceived values, always responding 
to the changing situations in the flow of discourse, and always returning the mind 
to its original state of emptiness.” (Lin 1994, 65) Goblets fill up, tip over, spill, 
right themselves, and return to equilibrium and poise. Yearley explains that 
                                                             
20 Zhuangzi 2.12: 予惡乎知說生之非惑邪。 
21 Ibid., 予惡乎知惡死之非弱喪而不知歸者邪。 
22 Ibid., 予惡乎知夫死者不悔其始之蘄生乎。 
23 Ibid. Yearley gives his own example, but I would offer the following lines by Emily 
Dickinson: “I felt a Funeral, in my Brain, / And Mourners to and fro / Kept treading – 
treading – till it seemed / That sense was breaking through –”. See The Poems of Emily 
Dickinson: Variorum Edition, ed. by R. W. Franklin (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1983), no. 340. These lyrics are immediately enticing and also confusing, 
requiring one to slow down and try to make sense of them, but in a way that also lends 
them to memorization and internalization. 
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“goblet language is that kind of fluid language in which equilibrium is kept 
despite (or perhaps because of) the presence of changing genres, rhetorical forms, 
points of view, and figurative expressions.” (Yearley 2005, 518) 
Three features of goblet language are especially salient to my purposes. First, 
goblet language dampens the authorial voice such that words seem to come from 
the void. Yearley observes: “We are rarely sure who is speaking and therefore we 
know neither from what perspective statements come nor with what authority 
they are delivered. We face…words that seem to come from a void.” (Ibid., p. 
523) Without any stable authorial voice to anchor the majority of the Zhuangzi, 
authorial intent fractures and meaning multiplies such that interpretation of the 
text becomes something of jigsaw puzzle made of glass. The effect is that the 
reader herself is able to, carefully, try and piece this puzzle back together. Here 
we are returned to lodging language, which helps the reader enter the text in such 
a way as to play an active role in the construction of meaning. 
Second, goblet words force the reader to respond actively and creatively to the 
Zhuangzi. One instance of goblet language’s spillover and then abrupt reorienting 
might be the countless non sequiturs that populate the Zhuangzi. Not only are 
entire casts of characters regularly replaced with others without warning, the 
entire topic or theme of conversation is liable to shift at any given moment. The 
lack of linear argument or plot forces the reader to make sense of things. What is 
noteworthy is that goblet language pulls us in often by dumping us out. The 
unstable nature of the text causes us to lose our footing, a loss that paradoxically 
forces us to scramble for purchase. 
Third, goblet language draws attention to the major Daoist theme of 
emptiness, particularly how emptiness ends up being productive and valuable, and 
a site of creation itself. The metaphor of the goblet is not that of a cup that empties 
itself and never fills up again. Yearley notes that “the vessel will never be empty in 
the sense that absence defines it—and a continuing motif in the Zhuangzi is how 
a perfected person’s emptiness and language always displays fullness not vacuity, 
stillness not a lack of vitality.” (Ibid., 525) Here one thinks again of Nussbaum’s 
remarks on humanity as a tenuous poise. Goblet language is poised between 
overflowing and emptiness, never staying in one state overlong and thus denying 
us the stability to say of language either that it is empty/meaningless or that it is 
full/meaningful. Language is both. It is ambivalent, and just as we have seen 
before, the mistake is in fixating on one state over the other. From a textual point 
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of view, goblet language (as well as lodging and double language) loses its power 
to affect the reader if we fixate on only one meaning. 
The chorus of the Bacchae shares something of the features of the Zhuangzi’s 
three types of language. Studies of the Greek tragic chorus frequently focus on 
the identity of the chorus. The chorus is often identified as an “ideal spectator” or 
the “voice of the people,” and in some cases as “the other.”24 In the Bacchae, 
where the chorus is explicitly identified as the Theban women who have forgotten 
their own identities and are swept-up in Dionysian frenzy, the authority of the 
chorus is called into question or at least problematized. Not a standalone 
character, not an ideal spectator (since the chorus certainly does not behave in an 
ideal way here), not the willing or free voice of the people, not the marginalized 
other (the maenad chorus has terrifying power and centrality)—the Bacchae’s 
chorus is a liminal voice, speaking with neither the knowledge nor the authority 
of Dionysus. In this sense, the chorus, like goblet language’s removal of authorial 
voice, invites the audience to construct their own meaning. The chorus can be 
compared to lodging language in opening a space or entry point for the audience. 
This, however, is not done by voicing any idealized civic wisdom with which the 
audience could relate. The Bacchic chorus instead exemplifies double/heavy 
language to speak from a position of seeming authority while simultaneously 
undermining or repeatedly smashing up against conventional wisdom. Anyone 
looking to the chorus of the Bacchae for ideal behavior or knowledge will be 
shocked and disappointed: the maenad chorus defies easy conceptual 
categorization and so forces a more active meaning-making on the part of the 
audience. Both the Zhuangzi and the Bacchae display oblivion as ambivalent, as 
an inescapable feature of humanness, humanness that is thus portrayed as tenuous 
and unstable. Euripides and Zhuangzi deny any comforting view of human nature 
and instead, on the levels of form (the chorus for the former and the three types of 
                                                             
24 Schlegel originated the “ideal spectator” theory, Vernant and Vidal-Naquet the “voice of 
the people theory,” and Gould the “marginalized other” theory. See, respectively: August 
Wilhelm Schlegel, A Course of Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature, trans. John Black 
and A.J.W. Morrison (London: George Bell and Sons, 1846); Jean-Pierre Vernant and 
Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Myth and Thought Among the Greeks. Trans. Janet Lloyd with Jeff 
Fort (Zone Books, 2006, original publication by Librairie François Maspero, 1965); J. 
Gould, “Tragedy and collective experience” in Myth, Ritual, Memory, and Exchange: 
Essays in Greek Literature and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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words for the latter) and content (Pentheus, the maenads, Yan Hui, Zhuang 
Zhou), offer a complicated tangle of the themes of forgetting, inattention, looking 
away, and fixation. Both texts seem to support Nussbaum’s description of human 
nature as porous and as passing in and out of boundaries. I have tried to give just 
a few examples of how the Zhuangzi and the Bacchae illustrate this in content 
and in form. 
 Let me close with a remark by Segal about the role of the tragic poet. In 
discussing how the Bacchae blurs lines between reality and illusion in both its 
form and content, Segal comments on Euripides’ own work: 
 
That artificiality or theatricality opens up a suspended, privileged space within 
the society where the familiar laws and the familiar logic do not apply, where 
the spectator confronts a hidden, coexisting chaos within the ordered frame of 
the art-work, the society, and his own personality. While opening that gap for 
socially useful ends (e.g. cathartic, apotropaic, or monitory), the mask’s 
freedom from reality also prevents complete reclosure.  (Segal 1982, 224) 
 
I contend that this description applies to the comparatist as well. Like a poem 
(dramatic tragic poem in this case), a comparison is artificial. The comparison 
“opens up a suspended, privileged space” in that the comparative context is, 
simply, unrealistic—that is, Euripides and Zhuangzi have no intrinsic reason to be 
compared. Willingness to abide in the temporary juxtaposition of a comparison is 
a privilege “where the familiar laws…and logic do not apply.” The poet asks our 
indulgence as we see the world refracted through her imagination and not as it 
really is—the comparatist does the same. In the process, we “confront a hidden, 
coexisting chaos,” or, in other words, we see that what we thought was the case 
might not be. In presenting alternatives and undermining assumptions, 
comparison dislodges our fixations, those strangleholds we have on truth or 
knowledge. The Zhuangzi repeatedly tries to pry our fixed grips open, and 
tragedy, on Segal’s reading, does the same. Finally, just as tragedy opens a gap, 
cracking away our fixed certainty, we are also left without “complete reclosure.” I 
take this to mean that the experience of relinquishing fixation (knowledge, 
beliefs, assumptions, etc.) cannot be undone. Comparison at its best should have 
this same effect.  
Lovin, describing the act of comparison, remarks: “It is an axiom of the 
quantum universe described by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle that the objects 
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of our attention are always changed by being measured, just as it is a 
methodological axiom of the social sciences that there are no observers who are 
not participant-observers. To know a thing is to change it in some way…”. (Lovin 
2010, 263. My italics) Comparison as a kind of poetry strengthens the idea that 
the comparatist is not a purely objective scholar but also a subjective maker, and 
this recognition should lead us think about comparative work differently. The 
Zhuangzi and the Bacchae, in their form and their content, emphasize how 
observers/readers/audience are incorporated into a work, just as the comparatist is 
changed by the comparison. For both comparison and these ancient texts, the 
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